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Climate Change and Social Engineering

Some key lessons gleaned from the recent climate-change talks in The Hague. Read More

The headline reads “World Powers Trade Charges on Climate Talks’ Failure.” The collapse of climate change negotiations (“the Kyoto process”) is blamed primarily on the U.S., identified as “the world’s top polluter.” A South African paper charges: “The United States remains obsessed with the idea that it can use the dollar to buy itself out of trouble.” Much sound and fury, but frankly, very little light. The Kyoto process proves itself to be confused — but also an important learning step.

It is necessary to separate the ideology from the science. The setback in the Kyoto process cannot be read as a rejection of the science of climate change: most new data and assessment support rather than challenge the hypothesis that anthropogenic global climate change is indeed occurring.

The details of the impacts, however, remain unclear: regional projections are uncertain, and important components of the carbon cycle have yet to be fully understood. Thus, for example, it is not yet known whether North America is, overall, a carbon sink or a carbon source (and the time cycles, and mechanisms involved, are not well understood). The statement that the U.S. is “the world’s largest polluter” is thus ideological and not scientific in nature, reflecting only one side of a ledger (emissions) whose other side (sinks) is not even recognized.

The oft-repeated charge brings out the social engineering dimension of the Kyoto process. It can be said that, for at least some, the Kyoto process became not a way to reduce global climate change, but to restructure society and its values, especially regarding the U.S. Its consumption patterns and wealth are viewed by many as immoral and unfair, and, accordingly, the Kyoto process became a way to force Americans to change. For example, German Environment Minister Juergen Tritten commented that the talks failed “because industrial countries wanted to count too much their natural forests as a source of man-made reduction rather than actually cutting greenhouse gases.” The negotiating focus became restructuring the U.S. economy instead of managing the carbon cycle. This approach was all the stronger because of its alignment with the ideology of environmentalism, particularly the Rousseauian return-to-nature and less-is-better elements. It was also noted somewhat cynically by some Americans that implementation of the European Union policies would differentially impact U.S. economic performance, along the lines of “If you can’t compete economically, compete through other policies.”

The validity of moral arguments held by various stakeholders, is not, however, the issue. What is relevant are three learnings that can be drawn from this experience, which are broadly applicable to earth systems engineering and management (ESEM) generally. The first is the integration of natural and human systems that characterize the human world. In this case, moral and equitable dimensions of human systems have intervened in a process to directly impact economic and technological behavior that, in turn, has clear couplings to carbon-cycle dynamics and, thus, climate-system dynamics. The Kyoto process becomes a mechanism by which the carbon cycle is changed to reflect human morality.

The second involves governance. The Kyoto process has been dominated by an environmentalist discourse, which is, at best, neutral towards a number of other important discourses: market capitalism, technology, and libertarianism, to name a few. And yet, of course, the goal of the process was to restructure societies, economies, and natural systems. Disregarding the subjective validity of the positions of various stakeholders, one can conclude that, as a governance and process matter, when such an ESEM process is undertaken, communication must be open, democratic, and inclusive. If it is primarily limited to one ideology or discourse, as in this case, the process is unlikely to be either robust or successful.

And thus the final lesson: the dysfunctionality of ideology when it grows to dominate an ESEM process. That which looks backward, and oversimplifies, as ideology always does, will seldom be a useful guide to a future that is in many ways a completely new, and highly complex challenge. The Kyoto process is not dead, but when it arises from this particular fire, it will hopefully be a different and more inclusive Phoenix.

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Allenby is environment, health and safety vice president, AT&T, and adjunct professor at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. The opinions expressed are those of the author, not necessarily those of any institution with which he is associated.

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