Where climate tech capital still goes and why
Three billion-dollar rounds in one quarter tell you what climate tech has become. The categories that cannot raise new funds tell you what it has stopped being. Read More
- In the third quarter, three companies each raised a billion dollars: a fusion developer, a fission developer and a company that leases home batteries and runs them as a power plant.
- Picking the right investment vehicle — growth equity, infrastructure credit or project finance — now matters more than picking the right theme.
- Currence, the firm whose data everyone cites, has redrawn its own definition of climate tech to include data center developers whose route to power is clean.
The opinions expressed here by Trellis expert contributors are their own, not those of Trellis or its editors.
In the natural life cycle of business and finance, companies get into trouble, and the first question asked is who has to pay for their products and whether those customers can stop buying. The quick second question is whether the business is fundamentally sound but poorly financed. Climate tech is now being sorted by both criteria.
In the third quarter, three companies each raised a billion dollars: a fusion developer, Commonwealth Fusion Systems; a fission developer, Valar Atomics; and Base Power, a company that leases home batteries and runs them as a power plant.
Firm power — fusion, fission, geothermal, storage — took in roughly $6.3 billion across 17 rounds, about 40 percent of all climate tech equity in the quarter, according to the third-quarter edition of the State of Climate Tech quarterly analysis.
Commonwealth, Valar and Base Power did not raise their money on the strength of their emissions math. They raised it because hyperscalers need electrons they cannot get from the electricity grid on the schedule their lenders require.
The aggregate numbers tell the same story: Capital is concentrating in fewer companies, nearly all of them selling to companies behind the artificial intelligence (AI) buildout. There is funding for fundamentally sound, promising climate tech that can demonstrate customer interest or demand. Equity funding rose 17 percent in the second quarter to $15.8 billion, while the number of deals fell to the fewest since 2021. In the first half, 10 deals took 42 percent of the money, and low-carbon data center developers alone took a third, up from 3 percent a year earlier. More money, fewer companies, one kind of buyer. This is not a recovery of climate tech. It is a resorting of it.
The litmus tests for funding decisions
The sorting mechanism described below predicts which of a sustainability leader’s priorities will have a vendor in three years and which will not. Every category still raising funds passes most of these five tests. Every category that has stalled fails at least two.
First test: a buyer who must pay. Data center developers are paying up to $150 per megawatt-hour, roughly a 50 percent premium over what a conventional new power contract commands, for power that is clean, firm and available quickly. That premium is the carbon price that climate tech never got from policy. It funds first-of-a-kind geothermal wells, microreactors and iron-air batteries that no carbon credit ever would.
Second test: revenue visibility before the technology is finished. The customer now shows up in the capitalization of the company. Nvidia signed a development deal with Valar before Sequoia priced it at $6 billion; National Grid’s venture arm anchored Joulent’s $1.75 billion. A Series B with an offtake behind it is project finance with a longer runway, and growth investors have noticed: Series B funding jumped to $3.6 billion in the quarter.
Third, policy that survived. Nuclear and geothermal kept their federal tax credits and their bipartisan sponsors through the 2025 rollbacks in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. Offshore wind, green hydrogen, and much of the fuels complex did not. The watch item is that the Trump administration’s fiscal year 2027 budget request trims both the nuclear and geothermal offices at the Department of Energy. So, survival does not ensure future permanence.
Fourth, a visible exit. Fervo Energy’s $1.9 billion geothermal public market listing in May and X-energy’s $1 billion nuclear initial public offering reopened a window shut for three years; 17 climate companies went public in the first half. The glass is thinner than it looks. Both stocks are well off their highs — Fervo by roughly a third, X-energy by more than half — and third-quarter exits fell to 78 from 99. Public markets will pay for contracted backlog. They will not pay for a story.
Fifth, a story that can be told as security or resilience. Nuclear power offers energy independence. Grid flexibility is reliability. Earth observation, the satellite and weather-intelligence companies that raised heavily this year, sell to insurers and defense ministries. Critical minerals, from domestic mining and processing to battery recycling, are financed as onshoring initiatives. Each of these categories raised in 2026 without saying the word carbon — the one framing that does not raise money this year, and the one the field was named for.
What doesn’t pass muster
Now run the failing categories through the same tests. Carbon removal fails the first, second, and fourth: no buyer who must pay for these solutions, no revenue before the tons are delivered, no exit. Equity funding for this category fell 61 percent in the first half, the weakest stretch since 2020, after Microsoft paused new purchases and Amazon’s large nature-based deals set a reference price near $20 a ton, a fraction of what engineered removal costs.
Low-carbon fuels — sustainable aviation fuel, renewable diesel and e-fuels — fail the third: the U.S. aviation-fuel credit expired and its successor was narrowed, European buyers are waiting on the 2027 review of their fuel mandates, and funding fell by more than half.
Direct air capture has acquired “stalled” as its standing adjective. None of this is a verdict on the science, it is a verdict on who is willing to pay.
Capital stack shifts
In the first half, debt accounted for roughly a quarter of all climate funding, and late-stage climate looked like infrastructure finance: debt secured by projects and their contracted cash flows rather than equity bets on technology. In the third quarter, the trend shifted: asset-backed debt halved while equity rose.
Read that partly as timing — the first-half debt wave was fueled by battery storage projects locking in their construction loans — and partly as a signal that growth equity will underwrite firm power again, provided a buyer is attached.
The money is there either way: climate funds hold about $90 billion of dry powder after a record 2025 fundraising year. Funds are being selective, not starved.
There is a question climate tech is avoiding, and I will pose it without pretending to answer it: If the metric is megawatts rather than metric tons of emissions removed or avoided is this still climate tech?
Currence, the firm whose data everyone cites, has redrawn its own definition of climate tech to include data center developers whose route to power is clean. Gas turbines bought as a “bridge” are being financed to run for 40 years. A sustainability leader can read 2026 as the year climate tech finally found a customer or the year it was absorbed by one. Both readings are available in the same spreadsheet.
For those of us allocating family and foundation capital, the climate return has moved. It no longer sits mainly in early-stage venture capital but in growth equity with contracted backlog, infrastructure credit and project finance — vehicles with different fees, liquidity and failure modes.
Picking the right vehicle — growth equity, infrastructure credit or project finance — now matters more than picking the right theme. An investment committee that still treats “climate” as a venture allocation is pointed at the part of the market being starved.
That starved part is the point to leave with the reader. Carbon removal, fuels and early-stage mitigation are where the five tests fail, which is exactly why catalytic and foundation capital belongs there. The clean firm power being financed today was seeded a decade ago by investors who could not point to a buyer.
Someone is either seeding 2036 now or nobody is.
Which returns us to the second question asked of troubled companies: Is the business fundamentally sound but poorly financed?
Impact investors fret about a “missing middle” — promising climate tech that found a round or two and then hit an air pocket. In traditional markets, the ecosystem includes patient capital of every stripe, including deep value, stressed and distressed investors.
Some in the impact space, channeling heart over head, find something unseemly in that style of investing. It is in fact the logical consequence of a developed market; ask a climate tech company in turnaround whether fresh capital at a new and lower clearing price is unseemly.
I am pleased to see such participants germinating — some former students of mine created an investment vehicle, Good Machine, affording funds to take out reluctant earlier investors at a discount and provide equity-centric new money. At a recent conclave of impact investors at the New York Fed, several of us made the case that a full ecosystem needs this layer.
For sound technology that has simply run out of money, the lower price that new investors demand is not a verdict on the company. It is the door new capital walks through.